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Abstract
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benefit from not blocking truthfully. These difficulties are analyzed in games in which an a priori
given collection of coalitions can form, as the collection of pairs of buyer-seller in an assignment game.
The incentive properties of the core and of its selections are investigated in function of the collection.
Furthermore the relationships with Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms are drawn.
Keywords : coalition formation, assignment, manipulability, substitutes, incremental value, Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves mechanism.
JEL Classification : C71, D7
∗EHESS at PSE 48 bd Jourdan, 75014 Paris, France. e-mail demange@pse.ens.fr. I thank an anonymous referee and
Pablo Amoros for excellent remarks and suggestions.
1
1 Introduction
The idea of using the core as a model for assessing the stability of arrangements made within a society
has been proved quite fruitful in various contexts. In particular, the core is useful in the situations that
call for the society to split up into smaller self-sufficient groups, provided there are no externalities
across these groups. In these situations, the threat of blocking puts constraints not only on how
benefits are shared but also on which coalitions form. Shapley and Shubik (1971) were among the
first to use this insight in their analysis of the ”assignment game”. In a two-sided market in which
only pairs of buyer and seller are worth forming, possible outcomes specify which pairs end up making
a transaction and at what price. Stable outcomes always exist, supported by equilibrium prices.
The action of blocking is the driving force underlying the concept of the core. The predictions
given by the core may run into difficulties if some individuals or coalitions benefit from not blocking
”truthfully”. To define truthful blocking independently of any specific coalition formation process, a
solution is to consider the one-shot process that assigns the core to each possible configuration of indi-
vidual preferences and to study its manipulability. Since the core is not in general a singleton, several
definitions of manipulability are possible.1 For our purpose, the appropriate notion is the manipu-
lability by ”optimistic” individuals or coalitions as introduced in an earlier paper (Demange 1987).
Consider an individual who belongs to all coalitions blocking a given alternative. It may happen that
he prefers that alternative to each alternative in the core. If he indeed expects an outcome in the
core to obtain, why should he agree to block ? As explained in the paper, no such objection can be
raised if the core correspondence is not manipulable by an optimistic individual. Extending similar
considerations to coalitions leads to the concept of manipulability by optimistic coalitions.
Although quite surprising at first sight, the non manipulability of the core is not an innocuous
condition (we omit ‘optimistic’ from now). For example the core of an exchange economy can be
manipulable. Instead, the core of an assignment game is not manipulable by the essential coalitions,
that is neither by optimistic individuals nor by pairs of buyer-seller. This paper analyzes more general
coalitional games where, as in an assignment game, there is an a priori given collection of admissible
coalitions. Because of lack of communication or institutional reasons or organizational constraints for
instance, coalitions outside the collection are unable to form. Our first objective is to determine which
collections allow for the core to be non manipulable.
The analysis is conducted in the following setting. A finite number of individuals may organize
themselves into pairwise disjoint admissible coalitions (staying single is always admissible). Players
only care about the coalition they join and the amount of money they receive (or give), and utility
is transferable. Thus, an outcome specifies how the society splits up into admissible coalitions and
which transfers each coalition will implement within its members. As is well known, the core may
be empty, that is no stable outcome exists. Our first result states that both difficulties -emptiness
and manipulability of the core- are solved simultaneously. More precisely, consider a collection of
1These definitions depend on how preferences over outcomes are extended to preferences over subsets of outcomes.
Manipulability by an optimistic individual is obtained when a subset is evaluated through its most preferred element(s)
(see section 3).
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admissible coalitions for which a core outcome exists whatever the players preferences, as introduced
by Kaneko and Wooders (1982). Given such a collection, the (nonempty) core is non manipulable
in the optimistic sense by admissible coalitions (Theorem 1). Furthermore, the result is related with
Vickrey-Clarkes-Groves mechanisms (Vickrey 1961, Clarke 1971, and Groves 1973) : it holds because
an admissible coalition can achieve its incremental value over the remaining players at a core outcome.2
Aside assignment games, interesting examples are given by tree-hierarchical structures in which only
connected coalitions can be admissible (see Demange 2004 for a detailed analysis).
To address further the relevance of the core, the second objective of the paper is to analyze the
incentive properties of core selections. The first result is negative. No selection is strategy-proof for all
players. Even worse, manipulation is pervasive: an individual can manipulate whenever the selected
outcome is not one of his preferred core outcomes. A selection however may be strategy-proof for a
subset of players. As is well known in the assignment game, there is a generalization of Vickrey’s single
object auction that gives the incentives to all buyers to reveal their true valuations (Leonard 1983,
Demange et al 1986). It turns out that a simple property, the absence of a chain between players,
characterizes the collections of admissible coalitions that allow for a selection to be strategy-proof for
these players (Theorem 2). These collections ensure that the players are substitutes in the sense of
Shapley and Shubik (1971) independently of their preferences. In tree-hierarchical games for instance,
two players are substitutes only if no connected coalition containing both players is admissible.
The manipulability of core outcomes has been investigated in similar settings without money,
starting with marriage problems by Dubins and Freedman (1981), and housing markets by Roth
and Postlewaite (1977). Excluding side payments makes the analysis rather different. An outcome
is simply specified by a partition of the society. The core, necessarily discrete, is single valued for
some collections of admissible coalitions. Single valued cores allow the standard concept of strategy-
proofness to be used (Papai 2004). Also, in a generalized matching market, the existence of a strategy-
proof rule with desirable properties is closely related to single-valued cores (So¨nmez 1999). With side
payments, a core is almost never single valued so that similar results are hopeless.
Stability and incentives issues are also the subject of a vast literature in another type of extension
of the assignment game. Keeping a two sided structure, buyers (firms) may want to buy several
objects (workers), as in a job market (Crawford and Knoer 1981) or in various allocation problems
such as spectrum bandwidth auctions (Cramton 1995). The existence of stable outcomes, the design
of auction mechanisms to reach them, and the relationships with Vickrey payoffs have been studied
(see e.g. Ausubel 2004). In particular, as in this paper, Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002, 2006) show
the importance of the property of substitutes players and use linear programming technics. In contrast
however, restrictions on preferences, not on coalitions, are the keys to restore stable outcomes or to
state various properties.
Finally, our concern on justifying the blocking condition is related with the literature that recog-
2The importance of the notion of incremental value, also called marginal value or marginal product or (for a single
individual) Vickrey payoff, has been recognized in various contexts. Shapley and Shubik (1971) used it to introduce the
notion of substitute players. For a thorough analysis of the relationships between incremental values and competitive
behavior, see Makowski and Ostroy (1987).
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nizes that blocking should not been taken as granted when coalitions look ahead and try to figure
out the ultimate consequences of their moves. Based on this observation, various behaviors can be
justified so that only consistent sets of outcomes are predicted, as explained by Chwe (1994) in a
general context. For an application to coalition formation possibly with spill-overs across coalitions,
see for example Barbera and Gerber (2003) and Diamantoudi and Xue (2003).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the coalitional formation model, illustrates
it with some examples, and defines incremental values and stable payoffs. Section 3 discusses various
definitions of manipulability for the core correspondence and provides a justification for the manip-
ulability concept by optimistic coalitions. The non manipulability result on core correspondences is
given in Section 4. Section 5 is devoted to strategy-proof selections of the core, and the final section
presents conclusions.
2 The model and examples
It is worth recalling the basic features and properties of the two-sided market introduced by Shapley
and Shubik (1971). In the market, say a real estate market, there are two types of agents, prospective
purchasers, the ”buyers” and homeowners, the ”sellers”. Each buyer is interested in buying only one
house. The i-th seller values his own house at ci dollars while the j-th buyer values the same house at
hij dollars. The important data are the ”essential” coalitions, the pairs of buyer-seller, and the total
value they derive by forming, here hi,j − ci. The possible outcomes of the market specify which pairs
of buyer-seller end up making a transaction and at what price. One seeks a stable outcome, meaning
that no pair consisting of a buyer and a seller can make an arrangement that is more satisfactory to
both than the given one. Shapley and Shubik (1971) show that a stable outcome is supported by an
equilibrium price, and furthermore, that there is a minimum equilibrium price vector and a maximal
one. The strategic properties are the following ones:
(a) each buyer reaches his incremental value, or Vickrey payment, at a stable arrangement sup-
ported by the minimum equilibrium price vector. Hence, selecting the minimum equilibrium price
vector gives the incentives to all buyers to reveal their true valuations.3 Similar results hold for the
sellers by selecting the maximal price.
(b) no pair of buyer-seller can both obtain more than their incremental values by misrepresenting
their preferences (Demange 1987).
Our purpose is to explore the extent to which properties (a) and (b) hold true in a coalitional
formation model that extends the assignment game. We retain two main features: not all coalitions
can form and utility is transferable within a coalition.
3This property was shown by Leonard (1983) through linear programming and by Demange (1982) and Demange et
al (1986) through an algorithm in an appropriate graph, algorithm which can be interpreted as a multi-item Vickrey
auction. The existence of a stable outcome most favorable to buyers (or to sellers) and its incentive properties extend
to a setup with non transferable utility (Demange and Gale 1985).
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2.1 The coalitional formation model
A finite set of players, the ”society”, N = {1, ..., n}, may organize themselves into pairwise disjoint
coalitions, where as usual a coalition is a non empty subset of N .
A collection C describes the set of admissible coalitions : coalitions outside C cannot form. Through-
out the paper, singletons are admissible. The restrictions on coalition formation may stem from orga-
nizational or institutional reasons as illustrated in section 2.2. Our main interest is to relate collections
C and strategic properties such as stated in (a) and (b).
Players only care about the coalition they join and the amount of money they receive or give.
Player i’s preferences are represented by a utility function ui defined over the coalitions that include
i : ui(S) gives in term of money the utility for i to be a member of coalition S. One interpretation
is that i derives an ”intrinsic” utility for being a member of S. Another interpretation is that, once
formed, a coalition selects a given alternative independently of the preferences of its members. In that
case, ui(S) represents i’s indirect utility for the alternative chosen by S. Utility functions are not
necessarily increasing when an additional person is added to a coalition: an individual may dislike this
person, or may not enjoy large coalitions. Thus, I shall assume that any utility function is admissible.
The set of admissible i’s utility functions is denoted by U i. The n-tuple u = (ui)i∈N is a preferences
profile and U =⊗i=1,..,n Ui the set of admissible profiles.
A coalition S that forms can decide to implement transfers between its members, (ti)i∈S . Player
i receives ti (positive or negative), hence achieves a utility level or payoff of ui(S) + ti. Feasibility
requires total transfers within the coalition to be non-positive:
∑
i∈S ti ≤ 0. Thus, if S forms, any
payoff (xi)i∈S that satisfies
∑
i∈S xi ≤
∑
i∈S ui(S) can be achieved by S alone through adequate
transfers. This leads us to define the value of S by
Vu(S) =
∑
i∈S
ui(S). (1)
The society may split into several self-sufficient groups owing to individuals’ preferences - when
players dislike large coalitions for instance- or because of the constraints on coalitions as specified by
the set C -as in an assignment game in which only small coalitions can form. A coalition structure, as
defined by Aumann and Dreze (1974), describes how players organize themselves into coalitions that
are pairwise disjoint (hence membership to a coalition is exclusive) and self-sufficient (which excludes
transfers across coalitions). Since there are no spill-over effects across coalitions, the stability notion
based on the absence of blocking extends to coalition structures.
The following definitions of structures, blocking, and core are adapted so as to account for the set
of admissible coalitions.
C-partition A C-partition is a partition pi = (S`)`=1,...,L made of elements in C: S` ∈ C for each
` = 1, . . . , L. ΠC(S) denotes the set of all C-partitions of coalition S.
C-structure A C-(coalition) structure of N is given by a = (pi, t) where pi is a C-partition of N and
t = (ti)i∈N specifies transfers that are balanced within each element in pi:
∑
i∈S` ti ≤ 0 for each S`
in pi. The utility level reached by i, denoted by u˜i(a), is u˜i(a) = ui(S`(i))+ ti where S`(i) is the unique
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coalition of which i is a member.
The coalition structure a is said to be blocked by T if∑
i∈T
u˜i(a) < Vu(T ). (2)
The blocking condition is justified as usual. Recall that coalition T can achieve to its members any
payoff that sums to Vu(T ). Thus, if (2) is met, each individual in T could be made better off than
under structure a.The stability notion follows.
C-stability and C-core Given a profile u, a C-stable structure a = (pi, t) is a C-structure that is
not blocked by any coalition in C. The payoff vector (u˜i(a))i=1,...,n of a C-stable structure is called
C-stable. The set of C-stable structures is called the C-core.
The collections for which a stable structure exists for any profile are of particular interest.
Guarantee of stability A collection C guarantees stability on the set of profiles U if for any u in U
the C-core is non empty.
The guarantee of stability imposes quite severe restrictions. To illustrate why, assume that col-
lection C contains a Condorcet triple, that is three coalitions Si, i = 1,2,3, which intersect each other
but whose overall intersection is empty : Si ∩ Sj 6= ∅ and S1 ∩ S2 ∩ S3 = ∅. No C-stable structure
exists at a profile for which the value of each Si is equal to 1 and the value of other coalitions are nil.
Thus, the absence of a Condorcet triple is necessary for a collection to guarantee stability. It is not
sufficient. Kaneko and Wooders (1982) provide a necessary and sufficient condition in terms of the
balanced families introduced by Shapley (1967). A family B of subsets of N is said to be balanced if
there are nonnegative weights (γS)S∈B such that
∑
S,i∈S γS = 1 for each i. A partition is a balanced
family (take weights equal to 1).
Partition property A collection C satisfies the partition property if any balanced family composed
with coalitions in C contains a partition.
Thanks to Scarf theorem (1967), the partition property is sufficient for C to guarantee stability
on any set of utility profiles. It is also necessary because the set U is rich enough to generate all
super-additive games. As expected, the partition property excludes Condorcet triples: A Condorcet
triple can be completed by singletons so as to obtain a balanced family that is not a partition.
2.2 Illustrative Examples
- 1 - The assignment game fits the framework by taking as admissible coalitions the singletons
and the pairs of buyer-seller. Observe that the game represents any situation in which the society is
divided into two types of agents who are constrained to interact through exclusive, bilateral contracts.
Stability is guaranteed because the partition property holds.4 When instead any pair in the society
4Existence of a stable outcome was shown through linear programming by Shapley and Shubik (1971) in the assign-
ment game and through the acceptance algorithm by Gale and Shapley (1962) in the marriage model (two-sided but with-
out side payment). Thanks to the partition property, existence is ensured with non transferable utility (Quinzii 1984).
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is admissible, as in a roommate problem, there are Condorcet triples and stability is not guaranteed.
Also, in the ”bridge game” in which only coalitions with four individuals are admissible, stability is
not guaranteed (Shubik 1971).
- 2 - The job market proposed by Crawford and Knoer (1981) generalizes the assignment game.
Entities are still divided into two subgroups, say firms and workers, with firms possibly interested
in hiring several workers (or buyers and sellers with buyers who may buy several objects). Here,
apart from singletons, a coalition is admissible if it contains a single firm. With at least two firms
and three workers, stability is not guaranteed : there are Condorcet triples such as {f1, w1, w2}
{f2, w2, w3}, {f1, w3, w1}. Some conditions on preferences are needed to ensure the existence of a
stable structure. If for example the firm’s preferences satisfy the gross substitutes assumption of
Kelso and Crawford (1982) the core is non empty (this assumption differs from that of substitute
players, see footnote 11). Interpreting entities as buyers and sellers, the package assignment model is
obtained in which buyers are possibly interested in several objects (Bikhchandani and Ostroy 2002).
- 3 - Networks games. Individuals are linked through a network and only the connected coalitions
can form (see Kalai et al. 1979 for an earlier analysis of stability in an exchange economy.) When
the network is a simple path, a consecutive game is obtained in which individuals are ordered and
admissible coalitions are intervals as in Greenberg and Weber (1993). More generally, when the
network is a tree, individuals are partially ordered as in a hierarchical structure (Demange 2004).
Stability is guaranteed for a tree (or disjoint trees), and fails when the network contains a cycle since
a Condorcet triple of connected coalitions exists.
Before introducing our last example, it is worth noting some simple properties about sub-collections
of a collection C. First, if C satisfies the partition property, all its sub-collections satisfy it: their cores
are non empty. Second, dropping some coalitions from a collection C has two effects. On one hand
less coalitions can block. On the other hand less coalitions can form, hence less structures are feasible.
As a result, the cores associated with nested collections cannot be compared. This remark applies to
the collection of connected sets in a tree : dropping some connected sets generates truly different (non
empty) cores. This is illustrated in the last example and in Section 5.
- 4 - Collection of single-lapping coalitions5 (Papai 2004). In the absence of transfers the core
associated with single-lapping coalitions is single valued and strategy-proof. Such result does not
extend to the side payments case. To see this, suppose N to be admissible for instance. The single
lapping property requires that only singletons are also admissible. Hence only two structures are
feasible: N or the partition of singletons. Given a profile, the unique stable structure is N if it Pareto
dominates the partition of singletons, and is the partition otherwise. Allowing transfers dramatically
enlarges the set of stable payoffs: it coincides with all individually rational payoffs summing to Vu(N)
when N is worth forming, that is when Vu(N) >
∑
i ui(i).
More generally, in a game with side payments, a non empty core is typically multi-valued. Two
5The conditions on admissible coalitions are (1) no pair have more than one element in common, and (2) any cycle
of intersecting coalitions have the same (single) element in common. Surely, there is a tree for which all admissible
coalitions are connected.
7
routes are open: to study the strategy-proofness of selections of the core or to extend strategy-proofness
to correspondences. They will be investigated in Section 3.
2.3 Incremental values and C-stable payoffs
A coalitional game as described by Vu and C may not be a transferable utility (TU) game owing to
the restriction on transfers across coalitions. In order to define players’ incremental values, which will
play a crucial role, we consider an auxiliary TU super-additive game V u, called the super-additive
cover. Allow each coalition S to split up into elements of C and to implement transfers across these
elements. By choosing to partition into pi, S can achieve to its members any payoff that sum to∑
T∈pi Vu(T ), the sum of the values of the elements in the partition. Hence define the value of pi by
Vu(pi) =
∑
T∈pi Vu(T ). The value V u(S) is obtained by a C-partition of S whose value is maximal:
V u(S) = maxpi∈ΠC(S)Vu(pi).
A partition that achieves V u(S) is called optimal for S (typically it is unique). V u is clearly a
super-additive characteristic function.
Observe that, in order to reach all shares of V u(S), coalition S needs to implement transfers across
the distinct elements of an optimal partition (if any). This is why the characteristic function V u does
not exactly describe the coalitional game under consideration.
Incremental values An important payment for a coalition, in particular for a player, is the incre-
mental value to the set of all remaining players, that is the incremental contribution that the coalition
adds to total value. The incremental value of coalition T (to the set of all remaining players) is defined
by
V u(N)− V u(N − T ). (3)
The incremental value of T gives an upper bound on the sum of the payoffs that players in T can
achieve at a stable payoff: if T gets more, the sum of the payoffs to N − T is strictly less than
V u(N − T ) by feasibility, hence an admissible subset of N − T blocks.
More generally, the incremental value of a coalition T to a coalition S disjoint of T is defined as
the difference V u(S ∪ T )− V u(S).
C-stable payoffs As shown by Kaneko and Wooders (1982) the set of C-stable payoffs is described
by the set of inequalities ∑
i∈N
xi ≤ V u(N) and (4)∑
i∈S
xi ≥ Vu(S), S ∈ C. (5)
Inequality (4) states that the payoff vector x can be achieved through a partition of N , possibly by
implementing transfers across coalitions. Inequalities (5) are the no blocking conditions. Hence a
C-stable payoff surely satisfies (4) and (5). Conversely, it suffices to show that a payoff x that satisfies
(4) and (5) can be achieved by a partition without transfers across coalitions. Let pi be an optimal
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partition for N . Since any coalition S in pi is admissible, Vu(S) ≤
∑
i∈S xi by (5). Summing over the
elements in the partition pi and using the feasibility condition (4) give
Vu(pi) =
∑
S/S∈pi
Vu(S) ≤
∑
S/S∈pi
∑
i∈S
xi =
∑
i∈N
xi ≤ V u(N).
By optimality of pi, Vu(pi) is equal to V u(N). Hence all inequalities Vu(S) ≤
∑
i∈S xi for S in pi are
binding : x can be achieved by partition pi without cross-transfers.6
Thanks to the description of stable payoffs, the partition property is used as follows. The maximal
payoff that a coalition T can achieve at a C-stable structure is the value of the linear program in
which the sum of the payoffs to T is maximized under the feasibility and no blocking conditions. Up
to a transformation, the feasible set of the dual program is composed of the weight vectors supporting
some balanced families. Following Shapley (1967), the extreme points of the feasible set correspond
to minimal balanced families. This is how the partition property comes into play : minimal balanced
families are partitions. For T admissible, this will allow us to compute the value of the dual and to
recover the incremental values.
To simplify notation, {, } is dropped when there is no possible confusion. For example S−i denotes
S − {i}. Also S + i denotes the set S ∪ {i}.
3 Defining manipulability
In this section, no restriction is made on the collection C. The core, if non empty, is typically
multi-valued. Therefore, when a player contemplates misrepresenting his preferences he compares
two subsets of coalition structures. Various notions of manipulability are possible, depending on how
preferences over coalition structures are extended over subsets. Before discussing several possibilities,
it is worth noting that, whatever the collection C, no selection of the C-core is strategy proof for all
players.
3.1 Manipulability of selections
Given a collection C, let S(u) be the C-core at profile u. Let f be a function that assigns to each
profile u in U a C-structure. Function f is said to be a selection of S if it assigns a C-stable structure
at each profile for which it is possible :
f(u) ∈ S(u) for each u such that S(u) 6= ∅.
As usual, given a profile u, (vi, uN−i) denotes the profile with functions vi for i and uj for other
individuals. The following definitions are standard.
6The set of C-stable payoffs also coincides with the core of the game V u, which is described by (4) and the stronger
no blocking conditions
P
i∈S xi ≥ V u(S), any S: if the payoffs to S are less than V u(S), then at least one admissible
T subset of S does not get Vu(T ) and blocks.
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Individual i can manipulate f at u if for some vi in Ui u˜i(f(vi, uN−i)} > u˜i(f(u)). Function f is
strategy-proof for individual i if i cannot manipulate f at any profile.
Proposition 1 Let f be a selection of S and u a profile with a non empty core S(u). If i’s payoff at
f(u) is strictly smaller than his maximum stable payoff, then i can manipulate f at u. Consequently,
if the C-stable payoffs are not all equal, then at least one individual can manipulate f at u.
The proof is in the appendix. It relies on the following property: when the maximum stable payoff
of individual i is strictly larger than the minimal one, i is never single at a stable structure. This is
surely the case if i does not reach his maximum stable payoff Mi at f(u). Then, by increasing i’s
utility for standing alone to some value vi(i) larger than u˜i(f(u)) but smaller than Mi, the stable
structures are simply reduced to those in which i ’s true payoff is at least vi(i). Thus i is surely better
off at f(vi, uN−i).
3.2 Manipulability of the core
Let us consider now the manipulation of the whole correspondence S, starting with a single indi-
vidual. When player i contemplates announcing vi instead of his true preferences ui he compares
the set S(vi, uN−i) with the set S(u). If i evaluates each set on the basis of its preferred elements,
the associated manipulability concept may be qualified as ”optimistic”. This is the concept I shall
use. There are various arguments for this choice, not necessarily based on an optimistic behavior as
explained below. Let us first discuss the alternative notion that obtains with individuals considering
the worst element of a set.
Pessimistic individuals Pessimistic individual i can manipulate S at u with S(u) 6= ∅ if for some
vi in Ui
min{u˜i(b), b ∈ S(vi, uN−i)} > min{u˜i(a), a ∈ S(u)}.
In other words, a pessimistic individual can manipulate if misrepresenting his preferences allows him
to improve upon strictly the minimum utility level he achieves at a C-stable structure.
This concept leads to an impossibility result in our setup: S is manipulable by at least one pes-
simistic individual at any profile for which the nonempty set S(u) contains distinct payoffs. Consider
a selection of S that picks out a worst C-stable structure for player i at any profile with a non empty
core. Let u be a profile with S(u) 6= ∅. If pessimistic i cannot manipulate S at u, then the selection
is non manipulable by i at this profile. It follows from Proposition 1 that i’s worst and best C-stable
payoffs coincide. Thus, S is not manipulable by pessimistic individuals at u only if all stable payoffs
are equal.
Optimistic individuals Optimistic individual i can manipulate S at u with S(u) 6= ∅ if for some vi
in Ui
max{u˜i(b), b ∈ S(vi, uN−i)} > max{u˜i(a), a ∈ S(u)}.
Thus, an optimistic individual can manipulate if misrepresenting his preferences allows him to get
some structure C-stable for the ”false” profile that he strictly prefers to any C-stable structure for u.
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This concept is worth studying. A main interest is that a process based on truthful or “myopic”
blocking is justified only if optimistic individuals cannot manipulate. The argument does not rely on
how individuals evaluate a set of structures, in particular does not assume individuals to be optimistic.
To clarify this point, consider a process in which feasible structures are proposed and can be refused
by any admissible coalition. Let individuals indeed believe in the ”theory” that a coalition forms
to refuse a proposal if and only if it can block the proposal (in the sense of (2)). Thus the C-core
describes the possible outcomes of the coalition formation process.7 Let i be able to manipulate at u
and b a preferred structure in S(vi, uN−i). Suppose that b is proposed at some point in time. Note
that surely b is blocked at u and that i is a member of any blocking coalition (because otherwise b
would not be stable at (vi, uN−i)). Thus if i participates in a blocking coalition, he anticipates that
the process will settle at a final outcome in S(u). Instead, by not participating, i anticipates that b is
not refused at all because b is not blocked by coalitions of which he is not a member. Since he is better
off under the latter alternative, he does not join any tentative refusal, contradicting the assumption
of myopic blocking. Therefore the C-core yields a consistent prediction of a myopic blocking process
only if it is non manipulable by optimistic individuals.
Optimistic manipulability is also interesting because it is a rather weak requirement. As a result,
the correspondences that are not manipulable by optimistic individuals, as we shall display in next
section, are a fortiori not manipulable for more stringent notion. In particular optimistic manipula-
bility is easier than ”unambiguous” manipulability as introduced by Nehring (2000) : An individual
can manipulate without ambiguity if he strictly prefers any structure obtained by misrepresenting his
preferences to any one under truthful revelation. Unambiguous manipulation implies both pessimistic
and optimistic manipulation.
Example 1 : A manipulable core. Is the core manipulable in the optimistic sense ? Given that
the absence of blocking is a strong condition, the question is worth raising. Let us give an example of
a manipulable core with four individuals.8 Consider player 1 in the following game:
Vu(2, 3) = Vu(2, 4) = c, Vu(1, 3, 4) = d, Vu(1, 2, 3, 4) = 1, and all other values are nil.
Assume c ≤ 1 and d ≤ 1 so that {1, 2, 3, 4} is the efficient structure. The incremental value of
player 1 is (1− c). It is an upper bound on 1’s stable payoffs. The only possible stable payoff at which
it can be achieved is (1− c, c, 0, 0): {2, 4} must receive c (otherwise it blocks), which leaves 0 to player
3; similarly {2, 3} must receive c, which leaves 0 to player 4. However payoff (1 − c, c, 0, 0) is stable
7This raises the question of whether a decentralized process of myopic blocking eventually converges to a stable
structure. For a well chosen sequence of blocking coalitions, convergence has been proved in specific contexts, by Roth
and Vande Vate (1990) in two-sided matchings without money, by Diamantoudi et al. (2004) in the roommate problem,
by Sengupta and Sengupta (1996) in TU games, and more recently, by Koczy and Lauwers (2001) for coalitional games
with transfers as those in this paper. Note that with a finite set of outcomes, convergence of a specific sequence implies
convergence under an assumption of random blocking.
8With three individuals, each individual reaches his incremental value at a stable payoff if the core is non empty,
which ensures its non manipulability, as stated in next proposition 3. Normalize the game by setting V u(N) = 1
and 0 to singletons. Let individual 1 get his incremental payoff x1 = 1 − V u(2, 3), which leaves exactly V u(2, 3) for
{2, 3}. The non blocking conditions x3 ≤ 1− V u(1, 2) (for {1, 2}) and x2 ≤ 1− V u(1, 3) (for {1, 3}) can be satisfied if
V u(2, 3) ≤ 2− (V u(1, 2) + V u(1, 3)), which holds under the non-emptiness of the core.
11
only if c+ d ≤ 1: For c+ d > 1, it is blocked by {1, 3, 4} and 1’s maximum stable payoff is reached at
the extreme point (2− 2c− d, 1− d, c+ d− 1, c+ d− 1) in which each coalition {1, 3, 4}, {2, 3}, and
{2, 4} exactly gets its value.
Assume c + d > 1. By lowering his utility for {1, 3, 4}, player 1 decreases the value of coalition
(1, 3, 4) to some d′. His maximal payoff is increased to 2 − 2c − d′, or even to his incremental value
(1− c) if c+ d′ ≤ 1.
The definition of optimistic manipulability extends to coalitions as follows. Let (vT , uN−T ) denote
the profile with functions ui for individuals not in T and vi for those in T .
Coalition manipulability Optimistic T can manipulate S at u if there is vT and b in S(vT , uN−T )
for which
u˜i(b) > u˜i(a),∀ a ∈ S(u),∀i ∈ T. (6)
Thus, the members of T can manipulate if, by misrepresenting their preferences, a structure b that
they all prefer to each C-stable structure becomes stable. As for an individual, the members of a
manipulating coalition are essential for blocking the preferred structure, as stated in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 Assume that optimistic coalition T can manipulate S at u and prefers structure b as
given by (6). Then b is blocked at u and any coalition that blocks b intersects T .
Proof. The proof is straightforward. Let b be blocked by S. If S does not intersect T , then S also
blocks b at (vT , uN−T ). But then b cannot be C-stable for (vT , uN−T ).
Arguing as for a single individual, it follows from Proposition 2 that a process of myopic blocking
is justified only if no coalition T can manipulate the core in the optimistic sense. Otherwise, assuming
other coalitions to block truthfully, members of T facing preferred structure b can prevent b to be
refused and are surely better off in doing so.
3.3 Incremental values and non manipulability
The link between strategy-proofness and incremental values is known since the work of Vickrey (1961).
The argument extends to correspondences and coalitions under optimistic manipulability.
Proposition 3 A coalition that achieves its incremental value at a stable structure for profile u cannot
optimistically manipulate S at that profile.
Proof. Let coalition T achieve its incremental value at a stable payoff for u. Assume by contradiction
that T can optimistically manipulate at u. Surely the payoffs to T at the preferred structure b (under
the ”true” preferences u) are larger than its incremental value. Thus, denoting by x = u˜(b) the
payoff vector, one has
∑
i∈T xi > V u(N) − V u(N − T ), and by feasibility of x,
∑
i∈N xi ≤ V u(N).
These inequalities imply
∑
i∈N−T xi < V u(N − T ), in contradiction with the stability of b at profile
(vT , uN−T ).
12
4 On the non manipulability of the set of stable structures
From now on, the paper considers collections C that satisfy the partition property. Hence, the non
emptiness of the set S(u) is guaranteed. Our first main result relies on Proposition 3.
Theorem 1 Let collection C satisfy the partition property. Then, at each profile, for each coalition
T in C there is a C-stable structure at which that coalition reaches its incremental value. Therefore,
no admissible coalition can optimistically manipulate the C-core.
Applying the proposition to singletons gives the following corollary.
Corollary Let collection C satisfy the partition property. Then, for each individual, there is a most
favorable C-stable structure at which that individual reaches his incremental value. Therefore, no
optimistic individual can manipulate the C-core.
Note that without restrictions on coalitions, the maximum level that a player can achieve at a stable
payoff may be strictly smaller than his incremental value, as in example 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Index u is dropped. The maximum that members of coalition T can reach
at a C-stable structure is the maximum of ∑i∈T xi over the set of C-stable payoffs. Recall that this
set is described by the feasibility constraint (4) and the no-blocking constraints (5). Furthermore, it
is non empty under the partition property. Hence, the maximum payoff to T at a C-stable structure
solves the linear program :
maxx
∑
i∈T xi under
∑
i∈N xi ≤ V (N) (4) and
∑
i∈S xi ≥ V (S), S ∈ C (5)
Furthermore the value of the program is finite, reached, and equals the value of the dual by standard
linear programming results (see e.g. Gale 1960). Denote by λ and by δS the multipliers associated
respectively to (4) and the no-blocking condition (5) for coalition S. The dual9 writes as
min
λ,δ≥0
λV (N)−
∑
S
δSV (S) subject to (7)

δS ≥ 0 for S ∈ C, and δS = 0 for S /∈ C
1 +
∑
S,i∈S δS = λ, i ∈ T∑
S,i∈S δS = λ, i /∈ T.
(8)
We shall use the following lemma proved in the appendix.
Lemma 1 Given a balanced family B included in C with weights vector (γS), there is µ= (µpi, pi ∈
ΠC(N)) a vector of weights on C-partitions that satisfies:
µpi ≥ 0,
∑
pi
µpi = 1 and
∑
pi,S∈pi
µpi = γS ∀S ∈ B. (9)
9Write the Lagrangean
P
i∈T xi + λ(V (N)−
P
i∈N xi) +
P
S∈C δS(
P
i∈S xi − V (S)), asX
i∈T
xi(1− λ+
X
S,i∈S
δS) +
X
i/∈T
xi(−λ+
X
S,i∈S
δS) + λV (N)−
X
S∈C
δSV (S),
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Lemma 1 allows us to rewrite the dual program in terms of the vector µ in a form that is straight-
forward to solve. Let (λ, δ) satisfy (8). Consider the family of coalitions formed with T and the S that
have a positive weight δS . All these coalitions belong to C because T is admissible by assumption.
Also the family is balanced: the vector γ identical to δ except for T where γT = δT + 1 satisfies∑
S,i∈S γS = λ for each i with λ > 0 from (8). Thus, applying Lemma 1 to γ/λ there is a non negative
vector µ that satisfies:∑
µpi = λ,
∑
pi,T∈pi
µpi = δT + 1 and
∑
pi,S∈pi
µpi = δS ,∀S 6= T. (10)
Furthermore, thanks to the relationships (10) :∑
S
δSV (S) + V (T ) =
∑
pi
µpiV (pi).
Conversely, starting from any nonnegative µ = (µpi, pi ∈ ΠC(N)) that satisfies
∑
pi,T∈pi µpi ≥ 1, one
can associate λ and a nonnegative vector δ by (10) so as to satisfy the constraints (8) of the dual.
This allows us to write the dual in the variable µ = (µpi, pi ∈ ΠC(N)) as:{
minµ
∑
pi∈piC(N) µpi[V (N)− V (pi)] + V (T )
µpi ≥ 0,
∑
pi,T∈pi µpi ≥ 1.
(11)
Since by definition V (N) ≥ V (pi), the minimum is reached by choosing µpi = 0 for any pi that does
not contain T . For a partition pi that contains T , V (pi) ≤ V (T ) + V (N − T ). Thus the minimum is
reached by choosing µpi = 1 for pi that contains T and an optimal partition of N − T . This gives that
the value of the dual is V (N)− V (N − T ).
Can a non admissible coalition manipulate ? In the assignment game, the answer is positive for
a coalition of buyers (or of sellers) that can implement side payments.10 Let be one seller and two
identical buyers. Buyers value the object at s+ 1, where s is the seller’s value for the object. At any
stable outcome, buyers’ payoffs are null. Both are made better off by announcing each one a valuation
for the object equal to s and deciding on a money transfer from the winner of the object to the loser.
In network games, a non admissible coalition can make all its members strictly better off even without
implementing transfers across its members, as illustrated now.
Example 2. Manipulation by non admissible coalitions. There are three individuals on a line
with 1 in between and C is the collection of all connected sets (thus only {2, 3} is not admissible).
Function Vu is Vu(1, 2, 3) = 1, Vu(i) = 0, and Vu(1, i) = ci, i = 2, 3, where ci, is between 0 and 1. The
incremental values are 1, 1− c3, and 1− c2 respectively for players 1, 2, and 3.
10In Demange (1987), I gave a sufficient condition for the core not to be manipulable by any coalition, and showed it
holds in assignment games. The condition requires the set of stable payoffs to satisfy a weak version of Von Neumann
and Morgenstern external stability (1944) : For any payoff y that is blocked, there is a coalition T blocking y that can
be made at least as well off at a stable payoff x′ : yi ≤ x′i for any i in T (but T does not necessarily block y via x′).
Under this condition, a coalition, whether admissible or not, cannot manipulate if it is unable to implement transfers
among its members. The condition is not necessarily satisfied in our coalitional games, as shown by example 2.
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Assume c2 + c3 > 1 and consider players 2 and 3. Each one achieves his incremental value at
the same (extreme) stable payoff (c2 + c3 − 1, 1 − c3, 1 − c2}. As for the non admissible coalition
{2, 3}, its incremental value is equal to 1. It is not reached at a stable payoff : subtracting the
no-blocking conditions, x1 + xi ≥ ci, i = 2, 3 to the feasibility constraint 2(x1 + x2 + x3) ≤ 2 gives
x2 + x3 ≤ 2 − (c2 + c3) < 1. Players 2 and 3 can be better off by falsifying their preferences as
follows: 2 announces a lower utility for {1, 2}, thereby lowering the value of {1, 2} hence increasing
the incremental payoff of player 3, and similarly 3 makes 2 better off by lowering her utility for {1, 3}.
5 Strategy-proof selections
A selection of the core may be strategy-proof for a given subset of players, although not for all. For
instance, under the partition property, selecting a core structure at which a given player achieves his
incremental value is strategy-proof for that player (Theorem 1). More interesting, in an assignment
game, selecting the minimum equilibrium price gives to all buyers the incentives to tell the truth
because they simultaneously reach their incremental values. This section provides conditions on the
collection C under which a selection of the C-core is strategy-proof for a given subset of players. As
a preliminary, next proposition states that such a selection must give to each of these players his
incremental value.
Proposition 4 Let collection C satisfy the partition property. Given a coalition T (not necessarily
admissible) a selection of S is strategy-proof for each player in T if and only if each one reaches his
incremental value at any profile.
Proof. The if part follows from the standard argument. Conversely, a selection is strategy-proof for
each player i in T only if each one achieves his maximal stable payoff, by Proposition 1. Under the
partition property, this maximal payoff is i’s incremental value by the Corollary of Theorem 1.
Given a profile u, whether players indeed reach simultaneously their incremental values at a stable
payoff is characterized in terms of the value V u in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Let collection C satisfy the partition property. Given profile u, players in T simultaneously
reach their incremental values at a stable outcome if and only if∑
α∈S
(
V u(N)− V u(N − α)
) ≤ V u(N)− V u(N − S) for any S subset of T . (12)
Of course, condition (12) is always satisfied for S singleton. That the condition is necessary for S non
singleton is easy to understand because the incremental value of S, the right hand side, is an upper
bound on the payoffs to S at a stable structure. The converse is proved in the appendix. Note that if
S is admissible, the reverse inequality of (12) surely holds: since the incremental value of S is reached
at a stable structure it cannot be larger than the sum of the maximum each player gets, which is
the sum of the incremental values under the partition property. This suggests that no strategy-proof
selection exists for an admissible and non singleton T , as will be confirmed by our next results.
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In view of obtaining a core selection that is strategy-proof for T , our objective is to characterize
the collections C for which conditions (12) are satisfied at all profiles.
5.1 Substitute players and chains
This section considers two players, α and β. Condition (12) applies only to S = T = {α, β}, and can
be rewriten as
V u(N)− V u(N − α) ≤ V u(N − β)− V u(N − αβ) (13)
where to simplify N −αβ denotes the set N −{α, β}. Inequality (13) says that the incremental value
of player α to N − αβ, the right hand side, is negatively affected by the arrival of player β joining
N − αβ, the left hand side. This is a weaker version of the substitutes property defined in Shapley
and Shubik (1971).
Substitutes Two players are substitutes11 at u if
V u(S + αβ)− V u(S + β) ≤ V u(S + α)− V u(S) all S, α /∈ S, β /∈ S (14)
Players are substitutes if the incremental value of one of the players to a coalition is not positively
affected by the arrival of the other player in the coalition. Although a priori weaker, requiring condition
(13) to be satisfied at any profile implies that the two players are substitutes at any profile. To see this,
given profile u and coalition S, change the values of u into 0 for all coalitions that are not included in
S + αβ. Then (13) applied to this new profile gives that (14) holds for u and coalition S.
Collections for which two players are substitutes at any profile will be stated in terms of chains
that we introduce now.
Chain A chain between α and β is defined by two families of admissible coalitions, (Sk, k = 1, .., `+1)
and (Tk, k = 1, .., ` ) with ` ≥ 0, each formed with disjoint elements, that satisfy
α belongs to S1 and β to S`+1, no Tk contains α or β
Tk intersects Sk and Sk+1, k = 1, .., `.
For ` = 0, a chain is simply an admissible coalition that contains both α and β. For ` = 1, a chain is
given by two disjoint coalitions, S1 and S2, one that contains α, the other β, and a third coalition T1
that intersects both S1 and S2 but contains neither α nor β. Figure 1 represents a chain of length 2.
11 In the package assignment model with one seller, Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002) relate the substitutes property
with the possibility for the Vickrey payoffs to be reached at a price equilibrium. Note that the gross substitutes condition
introduced by Kelso and Crawford (1982) in a job market model (section 2.2) differs. It bears on how preferences of a
firm i over sets of hired workers vary with this set, that is, keeping our notation, on how ui(S + i) varies as workers α
or β (distinct from i) are added to the set of S of hired workers.
16
w
α
  
t
t
t t
tt
S1
t t t ttT1
t t t
S2
T2
S3
w
β
  	
t
t
Figure 1
It is easy to understand that two players who are linked through a chain are not always substitutes.
With a chain of length 2 for instance consider the game Vu that assigns 1 to each element in the chain
S1, S2, S3, T1 and T2, and 0 otherwise. One has V u(N) = 3, V u(N−αβ) = V u(N−α) = V u(N−β) =
2, hence (13) does not hold. The incremental value of each single player is 1, equal to the incremental
value of coalition {α, β} : each player cannot reach his incremental value at the same stable payoff.
The argument extends to a chain of arbitrary length.12
To summarize, we have characterized the existence of a core selection strategy-proof for two players
in terms of the substitute property or of condition (13) to be satisfied at any profile. Furthermore
these properties imply the absence of a chain between the two players. The important new point in
next theorem is the converse implication.
Theorem 2 Let collection C satisfy the partition property. Consider two players α and β. The
following properties are equivalent:
1. there is a selection of S that is strategy-proof for α and β
2. condition (13) is met for α and β at any profile
3. players α and β are substitutes at any profile
4. there is no chain between α and β.
Before giving the proof, let us illustrate the chain condition in two examples. In the first example,
an assignment game, it is already known that two players on the same side are substitutes and
we simply check that there is no chain between them. The second example is new and describes
the absence of a chain between two players in a tree game (-3- in Section 2.2). Observe first that
no coalition in a chain is a singleton (because Tk intersects two disjoint sets, and similarly for Sk,
k = 2, .., `; S1 intersects T1 at a different player than α, similarly for S` + 1).
In an assignment game, consider two sellers for instance, s and s′. No coalition contains both
sellers, thus there is no chain of length 0. For a chain of positive length, it must be that S1 ∩ T1 is a
buyer b1, since seller s does not belong to T1. Hence T1 ∩S2 is a seller s1 (because otherwise it would
be b1, who would belong to the disjoint sets S1 and S2). Thus S2 ∩ T2 is a buyer (because otherwise
12Given a chain of length `, let Vu assign to each element Sk or Tk in the chain, and 0 otherwise. Then V u(N) = `+1,
V u(N − αβ) = V u(N − α) = V u(N − β) = `, hence (13) does not hold at S = N .
17
it would be s1, who would belong to both T1 and T2). Continuing this way, T` ∩ S`+1 is a seller, who
can only be s′. But then T` contains s′, in contradiction with a chain.
Example 3. Substitute players in a tree. In a tree game let two players α and β be linked
through player 1 as in Figure 2. Players α and β are substitutes if C is the set of all connected
coalitions except those that contain both α and β.
Before showing this, let us interpret the collection. Let Nα the set of individuals who are connected
to 1 through α: they are in the subtree Gα containing α but not 1 (see Figure 2) and similarly Nβ
for β. In a feasible partition, if a coalition is formed with 1 and one of the players, say β, then Nα is
”left” alone and forms a partition. Thus, players α and β can be interpreted as substitutes vis a vis
player 1 who chooses which subtree is left alone.
By contradiction, consider a chain between α and β. Since no admissible coalition contains both
α and β, the chain is of positive length `. We show that both S1 and S`+1 contains 1, in contradiction
with the fact that they must be disjoint in a chain of positive length. Suppose that S1 does not contain
1: S1 is a subset of Nα. Then by definition T1 intersects Nα (since it intersects S1), is connected and
does not contain α : it is included in Nα. The same argument inductively shows that all sets in the
chain are included in Nα, hence do not contain 1. Thus no set in the chain contains β, a contradiction:
S1 contains 1. That S`+1 contains 1 follows from a similar argument.
In general, two players are connected through a path, say (α, 1, ..,m, β). We leave the reader to
check that α and β are substitutes under an additional condition: In the subtree obtained by deleting
Gα and Gβ there must be no chain between 1 and m.
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Proof of Theorem 2. That 1 is equivalent to 2 follows from Proposition 4 and Lemma 2, and that
2 ⇒ 3 ⇒ 4 has been shown in the text.
It remains to prove that 4 implies 2. Let pi be a partition for N and pi∗ be a partition for N −αβ.
We prove that, in the absence of a chain between α and β, all the elements of pi and pi∗ can be assigned
so as to get two partitions, one of N −α and one of N − β. This implies that (13) holds for any value
Vu on C by choosing for pi and pi∗ an optimal partition for N and N − αβ respectively.
Starting from piα = piβ = ∅, the following algorithm assigns alternatively elements of pi and pi∗ to
piα and piβ so as to end up with partitions of N − β and N − α. Let Sγ be the element of pi that
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contains γ for γ = α, β. Sα and Sβ are distinct since there is no admissible coalition containing both
α and β (no chain of length 0). Also if either one is a singleton the result is trivial. If Sα = {α} for
example, dropping {α} from pi and adding it to pi∗ give two partitions of N−α and N−β respectively.
Step 1
(i) assign Sα to piα and Sβ to piβ .
(ii) assign all elements of pi∗ that intersect Sβ to piα (there are some since Sβ is not reduced to
{β}), and those that intersect Sα to piβ .
Note that no element is assigned twice: otherwise there is T in pi∗ that intersects both Sβ and
Sα. Since T does not contain α nor β (pi∗ is a partition of N − αβ), this gives a chain of length 1, a
contradiction.
Let T 1γ be the union of all T assigned to γ, γ = α, β. By construction,
T 1α ⊃ Sβ − β and T 1β ⊃ Sα − α. (15)
If both inclusions are equalities, we are done. pia is a partition of Sα ∪ Sβ − β, pib a partition of
Sα ∪ Sβ − α and the remaining (i.e. not yet assigned) elements of pi form a partition of N − Sα ∪ Sβ
and similarly for pi∗. Completing piα with the remaining elements of pi and piβ with the remaining
elements of pi∗ (or the converse) give two partitions, one of N − β the other for N − α. If not, go to
step 2.
Step 2
(i-α) if T 1β 6= Sα − α, assign to piα any remaining S of pi that intersects a T assigned to piβ in step
1. For such S, there is a sequence (Sα, T in piβ , S) where T intersects the adjacent sets.
(i-β) if T 1α 6= Sβ − β, do similarly for β.
Since by assumption one inclusion in (15) is strict, surely (i-α) or (i-β) holds, so that at least a
new set is assigned. Furthermore no S is assigned twice: otherwise, the two sequences (Sα, T in piβ ,
S) and (Sβ , T ′ in piα, S) would give (Sα, T , S, T ′, Sβ), a chain of length 2 (T and T ′ are surely
distinct).
Let S2γ be the union of all S assigned to piγ at step 1 or 2 for γ = α, β. By construction
S2α − α ⊃ T 1β and S2β − β ⊃ T 1α. (16)
If all inclusions are equalities, we are done, arguing as above. If not, go to step (ii-α) or (ii-β) or both.
(ii-α) if S2β − β 6= T 1α assign to piα all the remaining elements of pi∗ that intersect S2β (those that
intersect S2β and that have been assigned at step 1 have been also assigned to piα). Thus for any such
T there is a sequence (Sβ , T1 in piα, S in piβ , T ) in which the new assigned set T intersects S and is
disjoint from T1.
(ii-β) if S2α − α 6= T 1β do similarly for β.
Observe that at least a new set of pi or of pi∗ is assigned since (ii-α) or (ii-β) holds by assumption.
Also, no new set T is assigned twice: otherwise, the two sequences starting from Sβ and from Sα
leading to T would give a chain of order 3.
Continuing this way, the process surely stops since at each step there is at least a new set of pi or
of pi∗ assigned.
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5.2 Extension to more than two players
A core selection that is strategy-proof for a subset T is strategy-proof for each pair in the subset.
Hence each pair of players in the subset must be substitutes. It turns out that it is sufficient.
Proposition 5 Let collection C satisfy the partition property and T be a coalition. There is a
selection of the C-core that is strategy-proof for each member of T if and only each pair of players in
T are substitutes at any profile, or equivalently if and only if there is no chain between any pair of
players in T .
Observe that no subset of T is in C because two players who belong to the same admissible coalition are
not substitutes. To illustrate, consider a tree game (example 3 in the previous section). Let coalition
T be formed with players who are directly linked to the same player 1 (α, β, and γ for instance in
Figure 2). Take C to be a collection of connected coalitions in which no one contains more than one
member of T . Then every pair of players are substitutes.
Proof. From Theorem 2 applied to pairs we know that any two players in T must be substitutes. To
show the converse, assume each pair of players in T be substitutes. From Lemma 2, we have to prove
that for every non singleton S included in T inequality∑
α∈S
(
V u(N)− V u(N − α)
) ≤ V u(N)− V u(N − S) (12)
holds. The proof is by induction on the cardinality of T . It is known to hold for T of cardinality 2
(Theorem 2). Assuming it to be true for any coalition with strictly less than p elements, consider T
with cardinality p. W.l.o.g. T = {1, ..., p}. By the induction assumption, (12) is satisfied for any S
strict subset of T . Let us prove it for S = T . Since p and i are substitutes for i = 1, .., p − 1, the
incremental value of p over a set containing i is not decreased when i is subtracted from the set. In
particular the incremental value of p over N − {p} is not larger than over N − {p − 1, p}, which in
turn is not larger than the incremental value of p over N −{p− 2, p− 1, p} and so on. Iterating these
inequalities from i = p− 1 down to to i = 1 gives that the incremental value of p over N − {p} is not
larger than over N − {1, ..., p}:
V u(N)− V u(N − {p}) ≤ V u(N − {1, .., p− 1})− V u(N − {1, ..., p}).
The induction assumption applied to {1, ..., p− 1} gives∑
α=1,..,p−1
(
V u(N)− V u(N − α)
) ≤ V u(N)− V u(N − {1, .., p− 1}).
Adding the two above inequalities gives that (12) is satisfied for T , the desired result.
6 Discussion and concluding remarks
The core of an assignment game enjoys nice strategic properties. This paper has shown how these
properties extend to some coalitional games. In particular, we have displayed conditions on the set
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of admissible coalitions under which it is justified to use the predictions of coalition formation given
by the (properly extended) core. The incentive properties of social choice correspondences depend on
how manipulability is defined, that is how preferences over alternatives are extended to preferences
over sets of alternatives. As a result, the literature has obtained impossibility results that extend
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem as well as a few possibility results. In the setting of this paper, the
“optimistic” extension plays a crucial role. We have shown that in some sense it is this weaker
notion that allows for possibility results. Furthermore, it helped us to understand better the incentive
properties of selections of the core. In particular, the existence of a selection that is strategy-proof for
a subset of players has been characterized in terms of the collection of admissible coalitions. Albeit
limited, these results make more precise the links between the structure of collaboration and strategic
behavior.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 Assume that f(u) is a stable structure but not one preferred by i. Let
[mi,Mi] be the non empty interval of i’s payoffs at stable structures. Surely mi ≤ u˜i(f(u)) < Mi. To
show that i can manipulate, change ui into vi only by increasing the utility for standing alone, ui(i),
to some value vi(i) larger than ui(f(u)) and smaller than Mi. Denote v = (vi, u−i). We show that
S(v) is the subset of S(u) obtained by eliminating all the structures in which i’s payoff is strictly less
than vi(i). Thus i is surely better off at f(v) in S(v) by announcing vi: i can manipulate.
Let a = (pi, t). Observe that the blocking conditions for u and v only differ at the singleton {i}. If
the partition pi contains {i}, a is stable for v iff it is stable for u. If pi does not contain {i}, a is stable
for v if and only if u˜i(a) = ui(S`(i)) + ti is not less than vi(i).
It follows that if i is never single in an optimal partition for u, at each a in S(v) : u˜i(a)) ≥
vi(i) > u˜i(f(u)) : S(v) is the subset of S(u) composed of the structures in which i’s payoff is at
least vi(i), as desired. It remains to show that the inequality mi < Mi implies that i is never
single at a stable structure. By contradiction, if i is single, one has mi = ui(i) (by feasibility) and
ui(i) + V u(N − i) = V u(N) (by optimality of the partition). Hence ui(i) is exactly equal to i’s
incremental value, which is an upper bound of i’s stable payoffs: this implies Mi ≤ ui(i) = mi, the
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desired contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 1. Given a balanced family B, let ∆ be the set of its weight vectors. ∆ is convex
and compact, hence is the convex envelope of its extreme points. As shown by Shapley (1967), an
extreme point of ∆ is associated with a balanced family included in B that is minimal, meaning that
it contains no other balanced family. Under the partition property, a minimal balanced family is a
partition, Hence the extreme points of ∆ are δpi (δpiS = 1 for S element of pi and 0 otherwise) where pi
is a partition included in B. Thus for any γ in ∆ there are non negative µpi summing to 1 such that
γS =
∑
pi µpiδ
pi
S for each S in B, which gives (9).
Proof of Lemma 2. Drop index u in Vu. Consider the program of maximizing the sum of the payoffs
to T over the stable payoffs, as in the proof of Theorem 1. At a stable structure, a payoff to a player
is at most equal to his incremental value. Therefore it suffices to show that under (12) the value of
the program is the sum of the individuals’ incremental values. Given a vector (λ, δ) that satisfies the
constraints of the dual{
δS ≥ 0 for S ∈ C, and δS = 0 for S /∈ C
1 +
∑
S,i∈S δS = λ, i ∈ T and
∑
S,i∈S δS = λ, i /∈ T.
Let B be the family of coalitions formed with all singletons {α}, α in T , and the coalitions S that
have a positive weight δS . B is made of elements of C and balanced. Using Lemma 1, the dual is
equivalent to
minimize
∑
pi∈ΠC
µpi[V (N)− V (pi)] +
∑
α∈S
V (α)
over µ ≥ 0
∑
pi,{α}∈pi
µpi ≥ 1, α ∈ T (17)
Since V (N) ≥ V (pi), the minimum is reached by choosing µpi = 0 for any pi that contains no singleton
{α} for α in T . Now let a partition pi with positive weight µpi that contains several singletons {α} for
α in a subset S of T , S of cardinality greater than 1. Surely V (pi) ≤ V (N − S) +∑α∈S V (α). By
(12) this implies that
[V (N)− V (pi)] ≥
∑
α∈S
[V (N)− V (N − α)− V (α)].
Note that V (N −α) + V (α) is the value of a partition piα that contains {α} and an optimal partition
for N − α. Replace the partition pi by these partitions piα for α in S and assign to each the weight
µpi: the constraints (17) are still satisfied and the objective function can only decrease. It follows that
the minimum of the dual is reached by partitions piα, α in T , each one with a weight equal to 1.
Therefore the value of the program is
∑
α∈T [V (N)−V (N−α)], the sum of the individual incremental
values.
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